Abstract. In this paper, we present new distinguishers of the MAC construction Alred and its specific instance Alpha-MAC based on AES, which is proposed by Daemen and Rijmen in 2005. For the Alred construction, we describe a general distinguishing attack which leads to a forgery attack directly. The complexity is 2 64.5 chosen messages and 2
Introduction
Message Authentication Code (MAC) is a fixed length information used to ensure data integrity and authenticity, and is widely used in Internet community such as IPsec, SNMP, SSL, etc. MAC takes a secret key and a message of arbitrary length as inputs, and outputs a short digest. Many research groups have presented various approaches to construct MAC functions, for example, MAA [7] , UMAC [3] , OMAC [9] , TMAC [12] , XCBC [4] , RMAC [10] , NMAC [1] , and HMAC [13] , etc.
The MAC construction Alred was introduced by Daemen and Rijmen in FSE 2005 , and an efficient instance based on AES is called Alpha-MAC [6] . The Alred construction is an iterative MAC function using components of block ciphers. The secret key, which is used as the key of the block cipher, is applied in the initialization and the final transformation, respectively. The internal state is changed by consecutive injections of message blocks. The Alpha-MAC is the Alred construction instantiated with AES [5] . Since the AES algorithm has been widely used in the real world, the Alpha-MAC can be easily implemented, which is a factor 2.5 more efficient than the popular CBC-MAC with AES.
The designers [6] proved that the Alred construction is as strong as the underlying block cipher with respect to key recovery and any forgery attack not involving internal collisions. Furthermore, for Alpha-MAC, they showed that any colliding messages of the same size have to be at least 5 blocks long. Recently, Huang et al. [8] exploited the algebraic properties of the AES, constructed internal collisions, and found second preimages for Alpha-MAC, on the assumption that a key or an internal state is known. Biryukov et al. [2] proposed a side-channel collision attack on Alpha-MAC recovering its internal state, and mounted a selective forgery attack.
The main contribution of this paper is to present interesting distinguishing attacks on the Alred construction and Alpha-MAC, which can lead to forgery attack directly. More important, the distinguishing attack on Alpha-MAC can be applicable to recover the internal state, which results in a second preimage attack.
There are two kinds of distinguishing attacks on MACs. Preneel and van Oorschot [14] introduced a general distinguishing attack to identify iterated MACs from a random function. Using the birthday paradox, they detect the internal collision by appending the same one-block message. Another kind is to distinguish the cryptography primitive embedded in the MAC construction from a random function [11] . Recently, new techniques to identify the underlying hash functions of MACs are presented in [15, 16] . Wang et. al. [16] presented distinguishing attacks on HMAC/NMAC-MD5 and MD5-MAC, and recovered partial subkey of the MD5-MAC. Their distinguisher makes use of inner near-collisions, which can leak more information than inner collisions.
Our distinguishing attacks are enlightened by Wang et al.'s work, which can detect the inner near-collision with some specific differences. First, we describe a distinguishing attack on the Alred construction. By the birthday attack [17] , there exists a collision differential path with some specific differences in the state, which is an inner near-collision, and can be recognized with probability 1 by appending another message pair with the same difference. Second, we present a new distinguisher for Alpha-MAC based on a two-round collision differential path of AES. Furthermore, combining the structural features of the Alpha-MAC with the algebraic properties of AES, the differential path can be used to recover the internal state, which is an equivalent subkey. With the recovered subkey, we can obtain the second preimage of the MAC for any given message M and its MAC value. The complexity of all the attacks is up to 2 65.5 choose messages and 2 65.5 queries with success rate 0.63. Moreover, the distinguishing attack on the Alred construction is also applicable to the MACs based on CBC and CFB encryption mode.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we list the notations used in this paper and give a short description of the Alred construction and Alpha-MAC. Section 3 shows our new distinguishing attack and forgery attack on the Alred construction. New distinguishing and recovery attack on AES-based Alpha-MAC are introduced in the section 4. Finally, We conclude the paper in Section 5.
Backgrounds and Notations
In this section, we define the notations, and give a brief description of the Alred construction and Alpha-MAC. : the length of the MAC output M N : the concatenation of M and N S(a) : the output of S-box with a as input
Notation

The Alred Construction
The MAC construction Alred [6] bases on an iterated block cipher. The length of the secret key equals to that of the underlying block cipher, and the message length is a multiple of l w bits.
Denote the i-th message word as x i , and the state after the i-th iteration as y i . For message M = (x 1 , x 2 , · · · , x t ), the construction is as follows.
1. Apply the block cipher to the state of all-zero block, i. e.,
2. Perform the following iteration f for each message word: (a) Injection layout :
Map the bits of the message word to an injection input that has the same dimensions as a sequence of r round keys of the block cipher. (b) Apply a sequence of r block cipher round functions to the state, replacing the round keys with the injection input.
3. Apply the block cipher to the state y t , and truncate the first l m bits of the state as the output. The final output C is C = T runc(Enc k (y t )).
A Brief Description of Alpha-MAC
Alpha-MAC [6] is a specific instance of the Alred construction with AES as the underlying block cipher, where l w = 32 and r = 1. Similar with AES, the Alpha-MAC supports key length of 128, 192 and 256 bits. The Alpha-MAC function is depicted in Figure 1 .
Fig. 1. The Construction of Alpha-MAC
The message padding method appends a single 1 followed by the minimum number of 0 bits such that the length of the result is a multiple of 32. For AES-128, the injection layout places the 4 bytes of each message word In this paper, we assume there is no truncation on the final output, i. e., l m = 128.
The Outline of the Related Works
We recall the general distinguishing-R attack on all iterated MACs proposed by Preneel and van Oorschot [14] , and the distinguishing-H attack on HMAC/NMAC-MD5 and MD5-MAC introduced by Wang et al. [16] . These attacks motivate us to explore new distinguish attacks on MACs based on block cipher.
Preneel et al. proposed a general forgery attack on MAC by birthday paradox, which is applicable to all deterministic iterated MACs, including MAA and CBC-MAC. They detected all the colliding pairs among 2 (n+1)/2 known text-MAC pairs by birthday attack [17] , where n is the bit length of the chaining variable. For each searched collisions, i. e., M AC(k, M ) = M AC(k, M ′ ), they appended one-block message N to identify whether it is an internal collision, according to
Once an internal collision is recognized, they can query the MAC with M N ′ , then they carried out a forgery, i. e., a new message M ′ N ′ with a valid MAC. But the method can't distinguish the cryptographic primitives embedded in the MAC.
Wang et al. [16] introduced another interesting idea which can distinguish HMAC/NMAC-MD5 without the related-key setting and implement partial key recovery attack on MD5-MAC. The main idea of the distinguishing attack is: Firstly, they collect enough two-block message pairs (M N, M ′ N ) to guarantee the appearance of an expected internal near-collision in the first iteration. Then detect such a near-collision by changing the second block with another message N ′ . Once the expected inner near-collision is identified, the MAC is based on MD5.
Distinguishing and Forgery Attack on MAC Construction Alred
In this section, we present distinguishing and forgery attack on Alred construction. Enlightened by Wang et al.'s idea, we can get proper output difference as an inner near-collision by the birthday paradox. When the MAC construction is Alred rather than a random function, this kind of inner near-collision can be detected with probability 1 by substituting the last different message pair with another message pair with the same difference. Based on this detected inner near-collision, the forgery attack can be constructed immediately.
Distinguishing Attack on Alred Construction
The iteration part of Alred construction is based on the round function of block cipher, where the round key is substituted for the injection input. The core of our distinguisher is to detect ∆y j−1 , which is the output difference of (j − 1)-th iteration. According to the operation between the injection input and the state involved in the iteration f , the message word difference ∆x j may extinguish ∆y j−1 , and lead to a collision at the final output. The form of the difference depends on the operation between the injection input and the state involved in the round function, e. g., for Alred based on IDEA or RC6, the operation is modular addition, while for others, it is XOR. The rest of this paper takes the XOR operation.
. . . As shown in Fig. 2 , there is an inner near-collision after round j − 1. When ∆x j = ∆y j−1 , there will be
, which is an internal collision, and can be propagated to the output. If the construction is Alred with XOR operation, replace the (x j , x ′ j ) with different (x j , x ′ j ), where ∆x j = ∆x j , a collision still happens. According to this property, the distinguisher is constructed as follows: 
Note that t should be large enough to guarantee there is an inner near-collision at round j − 1, j ≤ t.
This attack requires about 2 (n+1)/2 chosen messages and works with a probability of 0.63 by the birthday paradox. If we double the number of chosen text-MAC pairs, the success rate can be increased to 0.98.
Remark. With regard to MACs based on CBC encryption mode for block ciphers, e.g. CBC-MAC, OMAC, TMAC, etc., the iteration of MAC is defined as follows:
The above attack can be applied similarly. Besides, the method also works for the MACs based on CFB mode, i. e.,
Forgery Attack on Alred Construction
Once the inner near-collision is identified, we replace message words with the same difference, and achieve a new collision pair. Hence, the forgery attack is easily realized with the same complexity and success rate as the distinguishing attack. The details are as follows:
is the colliding pair detected in the above distinguishing attack. We query the MAC oracle about M a , where
, and s is an arbitrary message string. Then we construct the forgery of
with one query.
Recovery the Equivalent Subkey of Alpha-MAC
The above distinguisher is applicable to distinguish the Alpha-MAC from a random function, however, we introduce a new distinguisher in this section, where the expected collision implies an inner near-collision with some specific differences. With this distinguisher, we can recover an internal state, which results in the derivation of the equivalent subkey, i. e., the state y 0 (See Fig. 2 ).
Some Useful Properties of AES
This section presents a two-round collision differential path of AES, and summarizes some useful properties based on it. The two-round differential path will be used to recover the inner state in Section 4.3. From the differential path, we can see that there is only one nonzero byte in ∆y t−1 , which equals to ∆x t,0 . Because MC is a linear transformation, and SR has no impact on the value of difference, we can compute the output differences of four S-boxes in the (t − 1)-th round:
Since the branch number of MC transformation in AES is 5 [5] , there are four nonzero bytes in ∆z t−1 . It is noted that given (y t−2 , y ′ t−2 ) and (x t , x ′ t ), there will be a collision if and only if (∆z t−1,0 , ∆z t−1,5 , ∆z t−1,10 , ∆z t−1,15 ) satisfies equation (1) , and the difference of other bytes in ∆z t−1 are zero. Thus, we have the following property: Property 1. Provided that (y t−2 , x t−1 , x t ) and (y ′ t−2 , x ′ t−1 , x ′ t ) following the tworound collision differential path, randomly choose 2 8 different pairs of (x t−1,0 , x ′ t−1,0 ) to replace (x t−1,0 , x ′ t−1,0 ), respectively, and compute 2 8 corresponding pairs of (y t , y ′ t ), there exists one collision of (y t pairs corresponding to each output difference on average. Hence, one randomly chosen pair leads to the expected output difference ∆z t−1,0 with probability 2 7 /2 15 = 2 −8 , there is excepted to have a collision among the 2 8 (y t , y ′ t ). This property is used in the new distinguishing attack to identify the Alpha-MAC from a random function. For Alpha-MAC, the inner state y t−2 is unknown, however, we can recover two bytes of y t−2 by the next two properties. 
According to Property 1, we get
Thus, we can guess all 2 16 possibilities of (y t−2,0 , y ′ t−2,0 ) and filter out the wrong ones by equation (2) and (3).
If there are more than one solution left, we replace the messages as described in Property 1, and get another pair (x t−1,0 , x ′ t−1,0 ) with
which leads to a collision, and achieve the right value of (y t−2,0 , y ′ t−2,0 ). The time complexity is dominated by the exhaustive search of 2 16 possibilities of (y t−2,0 , y ′ t−2,0 ), and the number of chosen messages to get equations (3) and (4) is 2 10 .
In a similar way, we can recover the value (y t−2,10 , y ′ t−2,10 ) by replacing the (x t−1,10 , x ′ t−1,10 ) with 2 9 different pairs of (x t−1,10 , x ′ t−1,10 ). Property 3. Suppose (y t−2 , x t−1 , x t ) and (y just the same as the ∆y t−1 in Fig. 3 . There exists such an inner near-collision with this form by the birthday paradox, and we can detect it by the new distinguisher. Moreover, combining with the properties introduced in Section 4.1, the detected difference can lead to the recovery of the inner state, which results in the recovery of y 0 . It is noted that, y 0 = Enc k (0), is equivalent to a prefix subkey.
Reference [6] claims that an extinguishing differential in Alpha-MAC spans at least 5 message words, and given the state value y i−1 , the map from the sequence of four message words (x i , x i+1 , x i+2 , x i+3 ) to the state value before iteration i + 4 is a bijection. Hence, we choose a structure composed of 2 64.5 messages with t-word length, where t ≥ 6 in order to guarantee the map form (x 1 , · · · , x t−1 ) to y t−1 is a random function, and the expected inner near-collision can be obtained by birthday attack. It is recommended to choose t = 9.
We construct two structures as follows:
where (x 1 , x 2 , · · · , x t−2 , x t−1,0 , x t−1,3 ) are randomly chosen, x t−1,1 , x t−1,2 , x t and η are fixed, i. e., we choose ∆x t−1 , ∆x t as shown in Fig. 3 . The distinguisher works in the following manner:
1. Query the MAC with all the 2 65.5 messages in structure T 1 and T 2 , and obtain the corresponding MACs. 2. According to the birthday paradox, a collision can be obtained, i. e., C 
Query the MAC with the new message pair (M a , M b ). If they still collide, the MAC algorithm is Alred-MAC, and goto step 3. Otherwise, we conclude that the MAC is a random function. -If a collision appears, the Alred construction is concluded as a Alpha-MAC by Property 1. -Otherwise, is based on a random function.
Complexity Analysis. The complexity is 2 65.5 queries and 2 65.5 chosen messages in step 1. There is only 2 queries in step 2, and 256 queries in step 3. So the total complexity is dominated by step 1, which is about 2 65.5 queries and 2 65.5 chosen messages. Success Rate. The probability that there is a collision among the two structures is 0.63 according to the birthday paradox. Once the collision pair is found, the conclusion of the attack is correct according to the property of AES. Therefore, the success rate is 0.63. We can improve the success rate to 0.98 by doubling the size of each structure.
Internal State Recovery of Alpha-MAC
In this section, we show a technique which can recover the internal state with the help of the new distinguisher presented above. When the inner near-collision is identified, we can deduce the input and output difference of two S-boxes in the (t − 1)-th round, which allows us to recover the corresponding byte (y t−2,0 , y t−2,10 ) according to Property 1 and 2. Combining with the relation between the round function of AES, we explore equations between the internal states, and can obtain 8 bytes of the state y t−3 . The rest 8 bytes can be recovered by exhaustive search.
We depict the process of the state recovery in Fig. 4 , where * denotes the difference that can be computed, ? stands for the unknown difference, and 0 means the same. The details of the recovery attack are as follows: , which follow the two-round differential path (See Fig. 3) , respectively. Then we achieve the value (y (∆z t−2,0 , ∆z t−2,5 , ∆z t−2,10 , ∆z t−2,15 )
For the (y 
From the distribution table of S-box, for a fixed output difference, there will be about 2 8 corresponding input, thus we can sieve 2 
are constructed as follows, the correct (y 
In this way, the value ∆z t−2,0 = ∆z t−2,0 , which means ∆z t−2 = ∆z t−2 since other bytes remain the same. Then (y t−3 , x t−2 ) and (y It is noted that the value z t−2,0 only affects four bytes of y t−2 , which is the bytes of the first column (y t−2,0 , y t−2,4 , y t−2,8 , y t−2,12 ), and the other bytes remain the same. So that the 2nd to 4th column of ∆y t−1 are the same with ∆y t−1 . Thus, there will be a collision at (y t , y 
Replace ( The following equation holds with probability 2 −8 .
Thus, ∆z t−2 changes, so that ∆y t−2,4 = 0,∆y t−2,8 = 0, and ∆y t−2,12 = 0 hold with probability 2 −24 . Therefore, query the MAC with the 2
, no collision will happen. In this way, we can sieve the right (y 
From all the deduced value of (y If there are more than one y 0 left, using the distinguisher to get another colliding pair, and repeat the recovery attack until there is only one value left. Two colliding pairs is enough to sieve the right y 0 .
The complexity of this attack is dominated by the distinguishing attack and the final exhaustive search, which is about 2 65.5 chosen messages and 2 65.5 queries. Second Preimage for Alpha-MAC Once the internal state y 0 is recovered, we can apply Huang et al.'s attack [8] to find the second preimages for Alpha-MAC directly, or Biryukov et al.'s attack [2] to construct a selective forgery attack.
Conclusions
In this paper, distinguishing and forgery attacks on the Alred construction and its specific instance Alpha-MAC are presented. The complexity of the attacks is dominated by the birthday attack instead of exhaustive search. We construct distinguisher to detect inner near-collisions with specific differences rather than collisions, from which more information can be derived. Especially for Alpha-MAC, our distinguishing attack can be converted into a recovery attack of the internal state, which equals to a subkey. The recovered equivalent subkey can result in the second preimage attack on Alpha-MAC. It is to say, for any given text-MAC pair (M, C), we can obtain another M ′ = M with the same C. Moreover, these attacks are also applicable to the MACs based on CBC and CFB encryption mode. 
